Agent Orange

Agent Orange (고엽제/枯葉劑) is the combination of the code names for Herbicide Orange (HO) and Agent LNX, one of the herbicides and defoliants used by the U.S. military as part of its herbicidal warfare program, Operation Ranch Hand, during the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1971. It was manufactured for the U.S. Department of Defense primarily by Monsanto Corporation and Dow Chemical.

Three-fold Perspectives
Agent Orange may be viewed from the following perspectives:

Product liability case
In Vietnam alone, it is estimated that 400,000 people were killed or maimed, and 500,000 children born with birth defects as a result of its use. The Red Cross of Viet Nam estimates that up to 1 million people are disabled or have health problems due to Agent Orange.

As a result, several lawsuits have been filed against the companies which produced Agent Orange, among them Dow Chemical, Monsanto, and Diamond Shamrock since 1978. In 1991, the US Congress enacted the Agent Orange Act, giving the Department of Veterans Affairs the authority to declare certain conditions 'presumptive' to exposure to Agent Orange/dioxin, making these veterans who served in Vietnam eligible to receive treatment and compensation for these conditions.

On January 31, 2004, a victim's rights group, the Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange/dioxin (VAVA), filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Brooklyn, against several U.S. companies for liability in causing personal injury, by developing and producing the chemical. Dow Chemical and Monsanto were the two largest producers of Agent Orange for the U.S. military, and were named in the suit.

On March 10, 2005, Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District – who had presided over the 1984 US veterans class action lawsuit – dismissed the lawsuit, ruling there was no legal basis for the plaintiffs' claims. He concluded Agent Orange was not considered a poison under international law at the time of its use by the U.S.; the U.S. was not prohibited from using it as a herbicide; and the companies which produced the substance were not liable for the method of its use by the government.

The U.S. government was not a party in the lawsuit, due to sovereign immunity, and the court ruled the chemical companies, as contractors of the US government, shared the same immunity.

In Korea, there is Seoul High Court case on this matter.

Catastrophic unbanization program
The program's goal was to defoliate forested and rural land, depriving guerrillas of cover; another goal was to induce forced draft urbanization, destroying the ability of peasants to support themselves in the countryside, and forcing them to flee to the U.S. dominated cities, thus depriving the guerrillas of their rural support base and food supply.

Equal treatment of Agent Orange victims
The Constitutional issue is explained below.

Constitutional Court decision in 2001
In June 2001, the Constitutional Court found nonconforming to the Constitution the provision of the Act to Support Veterans Suffering from Exposure to Defoliants which denies the eligibility of benefits for bereaved families of veterans who died without applying for benefits under the Act, on the grounds that the provision violates the principle of equality.

Background
During the Vietnam War, defoliants such as Agent Orange were widely used by the armed forces in military operation areas. Long after the War, scientists have epidemiologically proved that these defoliants could cause serious illness such as lung cancer. On March 10, 1993, the National Assembly legislated the Act to Support Veterans Suffering from Exposure to Defoliants (hereinafter called the "Act") to help Korean Vietnam War veterans suffering as a result of exposure to defoliants or bereaved families of veterans who died of aftereffects from exposure to defoliants.

However, the Act limited the families qualifying as beneficiaries under the Act to ① family members of a veteran who is confirmed to have died of illness resulting from exposure to defoliants before the enforcement of the Act, and ② family members of a veteran who, having applied to the Minister of the Office of Patriots and Veterans Affairs for benefits under the Act, died before being classified as a qualified beneficiary under the Act, but was posthumously recognized as a defoliant victim. Therefore, family members of a veteran who died before applying for benefits after enforcement of the Act, such as the complainants, do not qualify for benefits under the Act even if it is later proven that the cause of death of the deceased veteran was illness directly linked to exposure to defoliants. Complainants filed a constitutional complaint alleging that the instant statutory provision violated the right of equality and the right to property.

Majority Opinion
The Constitutional Court issued a decision of nonconformity (헌법불합치/憲法不合致), on a majority vote of six Justices.

A. Violation of Property Right
Article 32(6) of the Constitution states that "the opportunity to work shall be accorded preferentially, under the conditions as prescribed by Statute, to those who have given distinguished service to the State, wounded veterans and policemen, and members of bereaved families of military servicemen and policemen killed in action." To provide "the opportunity to work" refers to only one of many possible means to reward people who rendered distinguished service to the State. The statutory provision as a whole proclaims that the State has a comprehensive duty to compensate for the sacrifice and distinguished service of these individuals. Details of compensation are problems of the legislative policy, and the legislature should prepare necessary measures with due consideration to the economic status of the State, financial means available, and public sentiment. Individuals with distinguished service recognition can make claims for compensation only after legislators enact laws with detailed provisions awarding compensation to these individuals, and such is the case here.

The right to receive compensation has the same attributes as the right to property. However, because it is recognized as a right upon legislation in a particular statute, the right to receive compensation is not a property right protected by the Constitution until a particular individual meets qualification requirement stipulated by the law. Therefore, the complainants who have not yet met the legal requirements prescribed by the Act have not yet acquired the right to receive compensation, and the provision on review does not violate the complainants' property rights.

B. Violation of the Principle of Equality
Whether death of a veteran suffering from illness related to exposure to defoliants occurs before or after the enforcement date of the Act depends on very fortuitous factors such as the type of illness, time of contracting the disease and its seriousness, and the rate of progress of the disease. In either case, there is no difference in the fact that a veteran has suffered from aftereffects of exposure to defoliants. Therefore, it is unreasonable to discriminate against bereaved family members of veterans based on whether a veteran died before or after the Act entered into force.

Among the veterans who died after filing for benefits but before being recognized as a defoliant victim, there may be cases where the State was accountable for the delay in recognizing him as a defoliant victim, whereas in the case of veterans who died without applying at all, the State cannot be held accountable for a delay in the determining process. This may be the reason for distinguishing the two cases. However, the State does not need to take steps to compensate individuals for administrative delays if a veteran nearing his demise because of illness linked to exposure to defoliants filed for benefits but died immediately after applying for benefits. But, in cases of veterans who died before applying for benefits, it would be unreasonable to uniformly penalize veterans who neglected to institute proceedings because there would be many different reasons as to why veterans who died before applying for benefits under the Act did not apply: some veterans may not have known that they suffered from aftereffects of exposure to defoliants because of misdiagnosis; some veterans may have died before applying for benefits because of rapid development of disease; and some may not have known that the State enacted new laws to provide benefits to defoliant victims or that defoliant victims need to follow special procedural requirement to qualify for benefits.

However, what is more important is that compensation for veterans suffering from defoliant exposure and for family members of such veterans is not merely a gratuitous favor of the State. It is just compensation by the State for the honorable sacrifice that these veterans made for the State during the Vietnam War. Therefore, the State should continuously afford compensation for all veterans recognized as defoliant victims and their families to the maximum possible extent, which would be in accordance with the spirit of Article 32(6) of the Constitution. The central issue for compensation, then, is whether the cause of the veteran's death is illness resulting from exposure to defoliants during his tour of duty in Vietnam, not whether the deceased applied for benefits before his death.

It would be convenient for administrative purpose if the deceased applied for benefits before his death: in that case, a careful and more accurate diagnosis could have been made to determine whether the disease resulted from exposure to defoliants. It would be far more difficult and less accurate to posthumously determine whether the cause of death of a veteran was illness related to exposure to defoliants. However, the Act stipulates that in cases where a veteran died before enforcement of the Act or after applying for benefits under the Act, the cause of death would be determined by the certificate of death or medical records. This means that difficulty in accurately determining the cause of death does not only exist in cases where a veteran died before applying for benefits after the Act entered into force.

In conclusion, the statutory provision stipulating that whether family members of a defoliant victim qualify to apply for benefits under the Act depends on the fact whether or not the deceased applied for benefits before his death discriminates against family members of a defoliant victim who died before applying for benefits arbitrarily and without a reasonable basis, and hence, is unconstitutional.

Dissenting Opinion
Details of rewarding those who rendered distinguished service to the State are problems for the legislative policy. The legislature should prepare necessary measures with due consideration to the economic status of the State, financial means available, and public sentiment, and there exists a large degree of discretion.

The reasons that only family members of a defoliant victim who applied for benefits before his death qualify for compensation under the Act are as follows: First, the State can refuse protection of the bereaved family of an individual if the deceased, during his lifetime, was delinquent in exercising his legally protected rights; Second, because it takes a while to confirm that a veteran indeed suffered from an illness related to defoliant exposure, due to the lack of veterans hospitals, doctors and laboratory equipment, special treatment is required for a veteran who died after applying for benefits but before being recognized as a defoliant victim; Third, if a veteran is not required to apply for benefits, it is almost impossible to find out how many defoliant victims there are, and this leads to difficulty in assessing actual budget required to make compensation and the standard of the compensation itself; Fourth, if family members of a deceased defoliant victim are allowed to apply for benefits regardless of whether the veteran applied for benefits before his death, a decision of qualification for benefits will have to be based on records of medical facilities other than those designated and entrusted by the provisions in the Act. Considering the complications inherent in aftereffects of exposure to defoliants, this would bring questions of accuracy and reliability of the system recognizing defoliant victims; Fifth, considering the fact that family members of a veteran who was recognized as a defoliant victim but failed to be classified into class I-VII following a physical examination do not qualify for benefits under the Act, a question of equity would arise if the complainants are allowed to apply for benefits under the Act.

In conclusion, the statutory provision, stipulating that whether family members of a defoliant victim qualify to apply for benefits under the Act depends on the fact whether or not the deceased applied for benefits before his death has a reasonable basis, is not against equity or justice, is not arbitrary, and hence, is constitutional.

Aftermath of the Constitutional Court decision
Instead of a decision of unconstitutionality, the Court found the instant statutory provision nonconforming to the Constitution and ordered to leave the statutory provision effective temporarily for a limited period until the legislature revises the Act in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Following the decision, the National Assembly revised the Act on January 26, 2002. According to the revised Act, the bereaved family members of a Vietnam War veteran who died of illness related to exposure to defoliants before applying for benefits under the Act can apply for compensation whether or not the deceased applied for benefits before his death.

Supreme Court ruling in 2013
On July 13, 2013, the Supreme Court held 베트남 참전 중 고엽제에 노출된 군인들이 미국의 다우케미컬과 몬산토 등을 상대로 낸 손해배상청구 집단소송에서 염소성여드름 질병을 호소한 피해자 39명에 대해서만 고엽제 제조사가 손해배상 책임을 져야 한다고 판결했다. 대법원 민사3부(주심 이인복 대법관)는 13일 베트남 참전 군인들이 미국의 다우케미컬과 몬산토 등을 상대로 낸 손해배상 청구소송 상고심에서 원고일부승소 판결한 원심을 깨고 사건을 서울고법으로 돌려보냈다. 소송이 제기된 지 14년만에 사실상 원고패소 취지로 일단락된 셈이다.

원심 판결이 뒤집힌 이유는 크게 두 가지다. 원심은 우선 고엽제 노출과 비특이성 질환 사이에 연관성이 있다는 내용을 담은 미 국립과학원 보고서를 근거로 역학적 상관관계를 인정해 손해배상책임을 인정했다. 그러나 대법원은 △당뇨병 △폐암 △후두암 △기관암 △전립선암 △비호지킨 임파선암 △연조직육종암 △호지킨 병 △다발성 골수증 △만발성피부포르피린증 등 참전군인들이 겪고 있는 10개의 질병들에 대해서는 고엽제 노출과의 인과관계를 인정하지 않았다. 특정 원인에 의해 발생하는 '특이성 질환'과는 달리 발생 원인과 기전이 복잡하고 후천적 요인이 복합적으로 작용해 발생하는 '비특이성 질환'은 역학적 상관관계가 있다고 해서 발병의 원인으로 작용했다고 단정할 수 없다는 것이다. 재판부는 "역학은 집단 현상으로서의 질병에 관한 원인을 조사해 규명하는 것이고, 그 집단에 소속된 개인이 걸린 질병의 원인을 판명하는 것이 아니다"며 "비특이성 질환의 경우에는 특정 위험인자와 비특이성 질환 사이에 역학적 상관관계가 인정된다 하더라도, 어느 개인이 그 위험 인자에 노출됐다는 사실과 그 비특이성 질환에 걸렸다는 사실을 증명하는 것만으로 양자 사이의 인과관계를 인정할만한 개연성이 증명됐다고 볼 수 없다"고 설명했다.

고엽제 피해자들이 손해배상청구권을 주장할 수 있는 소멸시효에 관한 부분도 원심과 차이를 보였다. 원심은 "고엽제 제조사들은 고엽제의 인체 유해성을 고의적으로 은폐하고 미국의 역학조사에 개입해 부정한 방법으로 역학조사결과를 왜곡하는 등 중대한 사실을 속인 점이 인정된다"며 고엽제 제조사들이 소멸시효를 주장하는 것은 우리나라 민법상 권리남용에 해당되므로 허용될 수 없다고 판단했다. 그러나 대법원은 "신의성실의 원칙을 들어 시효 완성의 효력을 부정하는 것은 법적 안정성의 달성, 입증 곤란의 구제, 권리 행사의 태만에 대한 제재를 이념으로 하는 소멸시효에 제도 취지에 비춰볼 때 대단히 예외적인 경우에 한해 단기간으로 인정돼야 한다"고 밝혔다. 또 "개별사건에서 매우 특수한 사정이 있어 시효가 정지되는 기간은 불법행위 손해배상청구의 경우 아무리 길어도 3년을 넘을 수가 없다"며 "고엽제 후유증 환자로 등록한 날을 기준으로 3년이 지난 후에야 가압류를 신청하거나 소를 제기한 당사자들은 소멸시효가 완성됐다고 봐야 한다"고 설명했다. 이 때문에 고엽제 노출과 질병 사이에 인과관계가 인정된 염소성 여드름 질환 피해자 중 고엽제후유증 환자 등록일로부터 3년의 기간이 지나기 전에 가압류를 하거나 소를 제기해 손해배상청구권이 시효소멸하지 않은 39명에게만 손해배상 청구권이 인정됐다. 인용금액은 1인당 600만~1400만원씩 모두 4억6500여만원이다.

소 제기부터 대법원 판결까지 14년이 걸렸고, 선고 때마다 결과가 달라졌다. 피해자들이 소송을 처음 낸 것은 1999년이다. 대법원 관계자는 "고엽제 노출과 발병 사이의 인과관계를 따져봐야 하는 당사자들이 16,579 people이었고, 해외 자료를 검토해야 하는 사안이다 보니 선고가 늦어질 수 밖에 없는 면이 있었다"고 설명했다. 제출된 자료만도 500페이지 책을 기준으로 330권 분량에 달하는 대규모 소송이었다. 고엽제 피해자들은 1999년 소송을 내면서 미국의 고엽제 제조회사인 다우케미컬과 몬산토를 상대로 1인당 3억원씩 모두 5조1600억여원의 손해를 배상하라고 청구해 인지대액만 180억여원에 달했지만, 법원이 소송구조 결정을 내리면서 인지대 납입이 유예되기도 했다.

2002년 첫 판결은 고엽제 제조사 측의 손을 들어줬다. 당시 서울지법 민사13부(재판장 김희태 부장판사)는 "피고회사들이 제조·납품한 고엽제와 원고들의 질병들간에 인과관계가 인정된다고 할 수 없다"며 원고패소 판결했다(99가합84123등).

이 사건은 4년 뒤인 2006년 1월 항소심에서 뒤집혔다. 서울고법 민사13부(재판장 최병덕 부장판사)는 역학관계 조사에서 상관관계가 인정된 점을 근거로 고엽제와 발병간 인과관계를 인정했고, 피고인 다우케미컬 등이 시효 완성을 주장하는 것은 권리남용이라고 판단했다. 재판부는 피해자의 장애 정도에 따라 1인당 600만~4600만원의 위자료를 지급하라고 판결했으며, 대상은 6795명, 금액은 607억7600만원에 달했다. 재판부는 200페이지가 넘는 판결문을 적어 화제가 되기도 했다.

피고인 다우케미컬 사는 "대법원이 숙고해 인과관계에 대해 더 심리하도록 원심의 대부분을 파기환송하는 판결을 내린 것을 존중한다"며 "다만 염소성 여드름을 앓고 있는 39명의 원고에 대한 대법원의 판단도 증거에 의해 뒷받침되지 않는다는 점에서 동의할 수 없다"고 밝혔다. 또 "전쟁의 고통에서 벗어나지 못하고 있는 모든 분들에게 연민의 마음을 가지고 있지만, 다우케미컬과 다른 회사들은 미국의 Defense Production Act에 따라 군사적 용도를 위해 고엽제를 생산하도록 요구받은 만큼 이 문제는 한국 정부와 미국정부 사이에 적절한 방법으로 해결돼야 한다"고 덧붙였다.

파기환송심에서 원고들은 새로운 증거를 제시해 대법원 취지와 다른 결과를 이끌어낼 수도 있다. 그러나 장기간 소송을 진행한 만큼 새로운 증거가 제시돼 결과가 달라질 확률은 매우 낮다. 피고인 다우케미컬은 대법원 판결을 근거로 가압류를 풀어달라는 소송을 따로 낼 수 있다. 피해자들은 1999년 고엽제 제조회사인 다우케미컬과 몬산토의 국내 특허권을 가압류했다. 승소가 확정된 39명은 가압류된 특허권에 강제집행을 해 손해를 배상받을 수 있지만, 나머지 부분에 대해서는 압류취소 소송이 제기될 것으로 보인다. 당초 원고들은 대법원 승소판결이 나면 그 판결을 근거로 미국에서도 별도의 소송을 진행하려 했으나, 이 계획은 수포로 돌아갔다.